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A Utility-Based Indicator of Union Well-Being
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Can conventional economic analysis help in defining and measuring the success of labor 
unions? In this paper, a general indicator of union welfare is proposed and particular 
expressions for the wage and employment objectives of unions are rearranged to derive 
measures of union success or welfare. These indicators combine two measures: union 
density and the relative union-nonunion wage gap. The indicators are applied to describe the 
movement of union welfare in the United States over the past eighty years, the differences in 
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2 A comprehensive review of different types of welfare measures is contained in Diewert (1981).
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HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE TRADE UNIONS BEEN ? : 
A UTILITY-BASED INDICATOR OF UNION WELL-BEING
John Pencavel
I. Introduction
The conventional model of trade union behavior endows the union with an objective
function which is maximized subject to bargaining constraints.
1  In some respects, this model bears
a formal resemblance to the model of consumer behavior in which the consumer is furnished with
a utility function which is maximized subject to a budget and perhaps other constraints.  Given this
apparent partial correspondence, are there features of the theory of consumer behavior that might
be exploited to enhance the analysis of unionism?
In particular, the constrained utility-maximizing model of the consumer gives rise
to a rich welfare analysis with such concepts as the “true” cost-of-living index number, the
compensating  variation, and the equivalent variation.  These provide measures of changes in
consumer welfare.  Some concepts are deduced from the consumer’s indirect utility function while
others use the direct utility function to compare consumption bundles.
2  One may ask whether, by
analogy with the welfare analysis of the consumer, the theory of union behavior can be configured
to deliver a welfare analysis of unionism that permits inferences about when union well-being has
improved or deteriorated.  The parallel between the theory of the consumer’s behavior and the
theory of union behavior is far from complete.  Regardless, is there a welfare analysis for trade union
behavior analogous to the welfare analysis of consumer behavior?  If so, may we apply this analysis3 Thus, Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) constructed an index of well-being for the International
Typographical Union. 
2
 to derive indicators of the well-being of unions?  This is the principal purpose of this paper: to
define and to apply index numbers that provide ordinal measures of the welfare or well-being of the
trade union.
The indicator of union well-being below blends two dimensions of unionism: the
relative union-nonunion wage differential and union density, the fraction of workers who are union
members. The way in which these two dimensions are combined depends on the particular
expression of union objectives.  Two classes of objective functions are proposed and these are
manipulated to generate indices of union well-being.  The indicator will sometimes be referred to
as a measure of the well-being of unionism or as a measure of the success of trade unions.  These
are treated as equivalent names for the same indicator.
II. Conceptual Framework
1. A General Statement
The basic idea is to measure unions’ well-being or success by the degree to which
unions’  wage and employment objectives are satisfied in some state compared with some reference
state.  Unions typically have many objectives whose importance varies across different unions at a
given moment and varies over time for a given union.  In this paper, I shall overlook much of this
rich detail and focus on unions as a whole although the approach taken here may be applied to a
particular union or unions.
3  A variety of goals have been proposed for unions, but most observers
ascribe to unions a special concern with the compensation of their members and their members’
employment.  In the typical instance, wages and employment constitute two of unionism’s principal3
 objectives as befits their members’ concerns with their incomes.  Hence the objective or utility
function of unions is expressed as some function of the wages of union members, w
 U , and their
employment, E
 U.  In the unions’ objective function, V,  w
 U  is assumed to be gauged relative to a
reference wage, w
 R, and E
 U is gauged relative to a reference level of employment, E
 R .  The
empirical analysis below will be  conducted in economies where union and non-union sectors of
labor markets can be identified and where an a priori case can be made for w
 R to be given by the
wage in the non-union sector, w
N , and for E
 R to be given by total employment, E .  This will permit
the unions’ utility function to be specified in terms of two arguments: the relative union-nonunion
wage gap, M = (w
U - w
 N)/w
 N , and  union density, D = E
 U / E.  Denoting union utility or welfare by
V and using the subscript 0 to indicate some base or reference state, the unions’ objective function
may be written for the reference state as 
(1)
where g(.)denotes a monotone increasing function.  In some other state t , the unions’ well-being or
success is indicated by V t = g (M t , D t ) so a natural indicator of the change or the difference in
unions’ welfare or success is the ratio of V t to V 0 :
(2)
It needs emphasizing that the proposed indicator of unions’ well-being or unions’
success focuses on outcomes, not on processes.  That is, it measures union “utility” in terms of some
function of w
 U relative to w
 R and of E
 U relative to E
 R , not on how the values of these variables were
( ) Vw E g M D
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arrived at.  The utility indicator does not consider whether the legal environment is “friendly” to
unionism or hostile or neutral.  It does not consider whether these outcomes were achieved through
legislation in a country’s parliament or through centralized bargaining or through decentralized
collective bargaining.  These issues are not at all irrelevant for the well-being of labor unions;
process matters.  However, at this stage of the analysis of this topic, it is sufficient to develop an
indicator of union welfare or union strength that concentrates on outcomes, not processes.
Even restricted to outcomes and not processes, only two outcomes have been
identified: wages and employment.  In fact, workers and workers’ representatives care about many
more outcomes: the level and scheduling of working hours, the degree of security from arbitrary
actions of supervisors, the extent of worker participation in shaping their own working environment,
working conditions, non-wage monetary benefits, and other concerns.  What is done here with wages
and employment is necessarily an initial step and is incomplete .
Also observe that unionism’s well-being, equation (1), is measured in terms of
relative wages and relative employment.  This implies, for instance, that an increase in wages that
is enjoyed  by union and nonunion workers alike, does not raise the unions’ welfare.  This is
consistent with models in which a worker’s utility from his wage income is assessed by comparing
it with an alternative or comparison wage.  Or the union utility function in equation (1) may be
interpreted as the union leadership’s utility function.  The political position of the leadership
depends on their performance and the rank-and-file union members are apt to evaluate their
leadership’s performance by comparing their union wages with those of a comparison set of
workers, perhaps nonunion workers.
2. A Particular Expression for Union Objectives: the Stone-Geary
One formalization is to write the unions’ ordinal objective or utility  function as4 In the research on union behavior, objective functions similar to equation (3) were first used by
Dertouzos and Pencavel (1979) for the International Typographical Union (ITU) where the index
of union well-being (for the ITU) is constructed from the ratio of V t to V 0 .  In this instance, the
union’s indirect utility function forms the basis for this index.
5
(3)
Equation (3) is called the Stone-Geary function because of its resemblance to the work on linear
expenditure systems in consumer demand analysis.
4  If 0 # θ # 1, then the higher the value of θ , the
greater the importance of relative wages in union objectives compared with relative employment.
Make the important assumptions that, for the United States, the reference
wage w
R  is the wage earned by comparable non-union workers  w
 N and the reference employment
E
 R is given by total employment, E , in which case equation (3) becomes 
(4)
Given the relative union-nonunion wage gap is M = (w
 U - w
 N)/w
 N and union density is D = E
 U/ E,
the previous equation may be written
(5)
This states that union utility or union success rises with the union-nonunion wage gap, M ,  and with
union density, D .  Write the previous equation for the base state 0 and for another state t and, as in
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1 θ θ5 In published empirical research on behavioral models of unionism, the expected utility formulation




SG is the indicator of union well-being or union success corresponding to a Stone-Geary (SG)
expression of unionism’s objectives.  Qt
SG  depends on magnitudes that are, in principle, observable:
first, Qt
SG  is a positive function of the relative union-nonunion wage gap in state t compared with
the gap in state 0 ; second, it depends positively on union density in t compared with union density
in 0.  The relative weight on the wage gap and on union density depends on the value of θ (where
0 # θ # 1 ) such that higher values of θ imply a greater weight on the union-nonunion wage
differential. In calculating values for Qt
SG, we shall posit different values for θ . 
3. A Particular Expression for Union Objectives: Expected Utility
Under some key assumptions, the expected utility of the median union member may
be written as 
(7)
where n( . ) denotes the utility function of the median union member.
5  As before, suppose that the
nonunion wage constitutes the reference wage (w
 R = w
 N ) and suppose that total employment
represents reference employment (E
 R = E).  Also assume a linear logarithmic utility function  n(w)



































R (,) ()() . =− ϕϕ6 The union objective function is assumed to be ordinal so that monotone increasing transformations
(such as logarithmic) of the function that preserve the ordering are permissible. 
7
(8)
Write equation (8) for state t , form the ratio of V t to V 0 , and take antilogarithms
6 to arrive at the




Note that  Qt
EU is independent of the value of γ.  It is the counterpart of equation (6) which expresses
union objectives in the Stone-Geary form. Note that, for values of D t less than about one-quarter,
approximately e
 D = 1 + D .This means that, when D is less than 0.25, an approximate index of
union well-being implied by the expected utility expression for union objectives is
(10)
where the X in the superscript of Qt
EUX indicates that this is an approximation to the exact index in




 EU , Qt
EU X expresses union success or union well-being as an
ordinal index that combines two variables: the union-nonunion wage gap and union density.  The
combination of these two variables is not arbitrary but is an implication of the characterization of






































































1 008 For the United States, the sources of information for the union-nonunion wage gaps are, from 1922
to 1977, Lewis (1963) as reproduced and updated by Pencavel and Hartzog (1984).  After 1977,
wage gaps are those compiled by Hirsch and Macpherson (2007).  Information about union density
in the United States from 1922 to 1977 is from Troy and Sheflin (1985) and, after 1977, it is from
Hirsch and Macpherson (2007).  Lewis calculated wage gaps for groups of years (1920-24, 1925-29,
1930-34, 1935-39, 1940-44, 1945-49, 1950-54, 1955-59,1960-64) and I have retained his grouping.
Later years are as follows: 1965-69, 1970-74, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2005. 
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the form of the union “utility” function.  The particular way in which the union-nonunion wage gap
and union density are combined into one index depends on initial assumptions about the form of
union objectives.  Equation (10) suggests an especially simple way of measuring union well-being:
in state t and state 0 , form the product of one plus the union-nonunion wage gap and one plus union
density and divide the product value for t by the product value for 0.
We now provide three applications of these utility-inspired indicators of union
success or union well-being.  The first application is to derive an index of union success in the U.S.
economy over time.  The second is to describe the variation across demographic groups or sectors
of the economy in the success of U.S. unions at a given moment.  The third is a cross-country
analysis of the well-being or success of unionism among those countries for which wage extension
rules are sufficiently uncommon that there is a meaningful distinction between the unionized and
non-unionized sectors of the economy.
  III. Applications of the Utility-Based Indicator of Union Success
1. The United States over Time, 1922-2005
The first application is to derive an index that describes the evolution of union success in the
United States from the First World War to the present.
8   The base state 0 is set for the year 1977 so
Q t
SG = Q t
EU = Qt
EUX  1 in 1977.  The index (equation (6)) from the Stone-Geary functional form for
union objectives is graphed in Figure 1 where the four series shown correspond to different9 This cardinalization of the indicator of union success requires stronger assumptions about union
objectives than have been made.  This is one reason to trace the consequences of different functional
expressions for union objectives and for the derived indicator of union well-being.
9
assumptions about the value of θ in forming  Q t
SG.  The solid line in Figure 1 corresponds to the case
when θ is assumed to be one-third; the dotted line shows Q t
SG when θ is assumed to be two-thirds;
the dashed line corresponds to θ = 0.10 ; and the starred line corresponds to θ = 0.90 .  Q t
SG appears
to exhibit greater volatility when θ is one-third and one-tenth and this reflects the relatively greater
variation over time in union density compared with the union-nonunion wage gap. An audacious
generalization from the empirical research on union objectives (Pencavel (1991, Ch. 3) is that U.S.
unions tend to place a greater relative weight on employment which, if correct, would make the
indices corresponding to θ = 1/3 and θ = 1/10 the more  relevant ones.
Regardless of the value of θ , union success reached its zenith in the U.S. from the
late 1940s to the early 1970s since when there has been a steady decline.  When θ = 1/3 , U.S. unions
in 2005 were about two-thirds as successful as they were in 1977.  When θ = 2/3 , U.S. unions in
2005 were about three-quarters as successful as they were in 1977.  The difference in these estimates
of the decline in union well-being reflects the fact that union density has fallen more than the union-
nonunion wage gap and a heavier weight is placed on union density when θ = 1/3.
9
Figure 2 graphs the indices (equations (9) and (10)) of union success as implied by
the expected utility functional form for union objectives.  Again, the reference state 0 is given by
the year 1977  when Qt
EU = Qt
EU X = 1.  According to Qt
EU , U.S. union well-being was greatest in the
late 1950s and early 1960s when the index is some twelve percent greater than the base year 1977.
In 2005, this indicator of union well-being places union success at about 88 percent of that in 1977.
This contraction from 1977 to 2005 in union well-being as implied by  Qt
EU is similar to that implied
by Qt
SG when θ = 2/3 . According to both Qt
SG  and Qt
EU, by 2005, unionism in the U.S. is less10 These data are drawn from Hirsch and Macpherson (2007).
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successful than it has been since the 1920s.  In fact, Qt
EU suggests union well-being in 2005 was
eighty-seven percent of its 1920s well-being.  It is as if the legislation of the National Labor
Relations Act that was designed in part “to encourage collective bargaining” had never been
enacted.
It is also evident from Figure 2 that the approximation Qt
EUX closely follows the exact
series  Qt
EU so the approximate formula, equation (10), provides a simple and convenient way of
tracking the movements over time in union well-being.
2. Union Strength in the United States by Demographic and Sectoral Attributes in 2005
Now suppose that the base state 0 corresponds to “all workers” in the U.S. and
assume t varies across different groups of workers. Then the indicators Qt
SG , Qt
EU , and Qt
EU X
measure union success across different workers compared with union success for workers as a
whole.  For this, we use the union-nonunion wage gaps and union density calculated for White men,
Black men, White women, Black women, private sector employees, and public sector employees
in 2005.
10  The implied indicators of union well-being for these workers are reported in Table 1.
The union movement in the U.S. has been least successful for White women and most
successful for Black men.  White women have lower union-nonunion wage gaps and lower union
density than the other groups so their low ranking is expected.  The relative success of unionism for
Black workers corroborates Ashenfelter’s (1972) results .  Using information on union density and
union-nonunion wage gaps, as in this paper, Ashenfelter (1972, p.462) concluded “there is .....less
discrimination against Black workers in the average unionized labor market than in the average
nonunion labor market”.
 Union-nonunion wage gaps are lower for public sector workers than those for private11 The data on union-nonunion wage gaps and union density are drawn from Blanchflower (1996).
12 Certain extension rules did exist in these countries but they are not so pervasive as those in
Continental Europe.  Of course, even without extension rules, there are several reasons why
nonunion wages in these countries may diverge from wages in the absence of unionism in the
economy.   However, the empirical importance of these reasons has not been established with
confidence except in some particular cases.
11
workers while union density is considerably higher for public than private sector workers.  The
difference in union success between public and private sector workers is greatest if θ assumes low
values in which case differences in union density receive a heavier weight.
The expected utility indices imply rankings similar to those for the Stone-Geary
objective function.  Again, the values of the approximation Qt
EUX are close to those for the exact
values of Qt
EU . 
3. Union Success across Countries in the 1990s
Where have trade unions been successful and where have they languished?  To
address this question, consider the same indicators but now applied across countries.  The base state
0 will be the United States in the early 1990s and the data on union densities and on union-nonunion
wage gaps will also refer to years in the early to mid-1990s.
11  The countries whose values of union
success are computed will be those for which distinct union and nonunion sectors can be identified
and a plausible case can be made for the nonunion wage being the wage in the absence of unionism.
That is, we shall restrict our comparisons to those countries for which the reference wage may be
given by the nonunion wage (w
 R = w
 N ) .  These are countries in which extension rules play a
modest role in wage-setting: U.S., Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan.
12
The indicators of union success across countries are given in Table 2.  According to
all indicators, U.S. unions are the least successful even though the union-nonunion wage gap in the
U.S. exceeds that in other countries except for Japan.  Because this wage gap in the United States12
applies to a relatively small fraction of the work force, these Q indicators rank the union movement
in the U.S. as the least successful among these six countries.  In the early to mid-1990s, British
unionism is the most successful.  This is attributable to a relatively high union density in Britain of
39 percent (which has since declined, of course) and to an estimated union-nonunion wage gap of
15 percent.  The union-nonunion wage gap reported for Japan of 26 percent is the principal reason
for Japan being ranked as having relatively successful unions by the indicator Q t
EU and by Q t
SG with
θ = 0.9.
The relative standing of U.S. unionism will not surprise scholars.  However, when
θ is relatively high and for Q t
EU X, unionism in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, was only a little
more successful than U.S. unionism and this may be less unexpected.  There have been some
important changes in the law regulating unionism in some of these countries and values of M and
D for the first decade of this century may alter the relative position of union success  in these
countries.
IV. Conclusions
This paper suggests that Economics can provide some guidance in determining which
unions or which union movements have been successful and which have not.  These indicators of
union well-being rest on the conventional characterization of unions as being concerned with their
members’ wage and employment outcomes.  The indicators combine measures of union density and
of the union-nonunion wage gap.  Clearly, if unions have goals that embrace other outcomes such
as work hours, then the analysis here would have to be altered.  In addition, the approach in this
paper would have to be modified for those economies where union-negotiated wage scales apply to
many nonunion workers so that union-nonunion wage gaps are small and where union density13 The model of union behavior exploited in this paper has a number of falsifiable implications.  For
instance, one sharp prediction is that, if unions maximize their rents and if unions and firms
negotiate efficient contracts, employment will be independent of wages.  See Brown and Ashenfelter
(1986).  More on the comparative statics of these models is contained in Booth (1995), Oswald
(1985), and Pencavel (1991). 
13
sharply understates the scope of union-negotiated agreements.  In principle, however, this
framework could encompass this.
The computed indicators of trade union well-being imply that U.S. unions were most
successful in the 1950s and 1960s and their well-being in the first decade of the twenty-first century
is little different from that in the 1920s when unionism was struggling to gain a foothold.  U.S.
unions appear to have been more successful for Black workers and especially for Black men.
Comparing U.S. unionism with that in countries whose labor markets resemble those in the U.S.,
even though union-nonunion wage gaps in the U.S. are high compared with union-nonunion wage
differentials elsewhere, the extent of unionism in the U.S. is so small that unions are judged as least
successful in the U.S.  Unionism in Canada and Australia is only slightly more successful than that
in the U.S.  In the 1990s, among these six countries, unionism was most successful in Britain.
Finally, a word about methodology.  The indicators proposed and constructed here
are a logical consequence of the assumptions made.  In the same way as measurements of
compensating variation and of “true” cost-of-living index numbers are logical applications of the
theory of consumer demand and contain no more falsifiable implications than are embodied in the
theory of demand so the indicators of trade union well-being in this paper have no more falsifiable
predictions than the model of trade union behavior on which they rest.
13
It may be asked, why are these indicators of trade union well-being or success rather
than indicators of, say, trade union strength.  Because higher union density and larger union-
nonunion wage gaps are sometimes viewed as noisy signals of union power, it is perfectly14
understandable if some would prefer to call the  indices in this paper indicators of trade union
strength.  Often scholars describe unionism as “strong” when a relatively large fraction of workers
are union members or are covered by union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements (Bowdler
and Nunziata (2007), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, pp.3-4), Rees (1989, Ch. 13)) although
they may also look at other signals of “strength” such as the coordination of bargaining and the use
of two-tier wage systems that distinguish between the pay of new hires and that of workers inherited
from the past.   Other scholars follow the Webbs (1897, p.816) who suggested that wage outcomes
were a necessary part of defining powerful unions.  In other words, the two key variables in this
paper, union density and wage differentials, have been used by others to identify strong or weak
unionism.  In the past, however, no-one has proposed the particular ways in which union density and
union-nonunion wage gaps are combined in this paper.  These combinations follow from some
simple assumptions about the form of union objectives .15
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Q
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Figure 2
Q
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θ = 1/10 θ = 1/3 θ = 2/3 θ = 9/10
A l l  w o r k e r s 111111
White men 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
Black men 1.26 1.20 1.12 1.06 1.08 1.07
White women 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98
Black women 1.13 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.05
Private sector 0.66 0.74 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.01
Public sector 2.62 2.03 1.41 1.09 1.24 1.1821





θ = 1/10 θ = 1/3 θ = 2/3 θ = 9/10
U.S.A. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia 2.03 1.67 1.26 1.03 1.15 1.10
Canada 2.15 1.73 1.26 1.01 1.14 1.09
Japan 1.48 1.36 1.20 1.10 1.16 1.14
New Zealand 1.77 1.50 1.18 1.00 1.07 1.04
U.K. 2.27 1.83 1.33 1.07 1.23 1.17